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FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS: THE
COURTROOM DOOR SWINGS OPEN
Steve Carey
I. INTRODUCTION
IF]ree speech and fair trials are two of the most cherished policies
of our civilization, and it would be a trying task to choose be-
tween them.'
The Supreme Court has declined to establish a fixed priority
with regard to free speech and fair trial rights, but it has defined
their boundaries to a considerable extent. In a recent case, Press-
Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, Chief Justice Burger wrote for a
unanimous United States Supreme Court that judges generally
may not bar the press from jury selection. This decision, coupled
with other United States and Montana Supreme Court decisions,8
makes it clear that criminal trials, including voir dire, must remain
open to the public, absent overriding interests articulated in find-
ings by the trial court.
This comment will endeavor to provide an analysis of the
steps required by the United States and Montana Constitutions
before the various phases of criminal trials can be closed to the
press and the public.
II. RIGHT OF ACCESS V. DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL
A. Issues at Stake
The fair trial-free press conflict reflects the tension between
the first4 and sixth' amendments. It is fundamental that a defen-
dant in a criminal trial has a right to an impartial jury in order to
ensure fair treatment of his or her case. The defendant's interest is
in avoiding a jury that is hostile or predisposed to rendering a
1. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 260 (1941).
2. 104 S. Ct. 819 (1984).
3. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982); Richmond Newspa-
pers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979);
State ex rel. Smith v. Dist. Court, - Mont. - 654 P.2d 982 (1982); Great Falls Trib-
une v. Dist. Court, 186 Mont. 433, 608 P.2d 116 (1980).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides: "Congress shall make no law... abridging the free-
dom of speech, or of the press. .. "
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed .. ."
1
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guilty verdict based on information received from outside the trial
process.
The public, however, has an interest in gaining access to and
information about public trials. This interest includes a concern
for justice in the individual defendant's case. There is also a
broader interest in maintaining the integrity of the judicial system.
When a system operates secretly, it faces the potential loss of pub-
lic confidence.' Consequently, the decision to close part or all of a
criminal trial depends on more than just the defendant's willing-
ness to waive the right to a public trial.
B. Case Law Controlling Access to Criminal Proceedings
Prior to Press-Enterprise, the United States Supreme Court
considered the right of the public to attend criminal proceedings in
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,7 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Vir-
ginia,8 and Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court.9
In Gannett, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
a lower court decision that excluded the public and press0 from a
pretrial suppression hearing." Holding that the right to a public
trial is a personal right of the accused, the Court concluded that
the public and press do not have a sixth amendment right to an
open pretrial hearing.12 If the defendant, prosecutor, and trial
judge agreed that an open hearing would jeopardize the defen-
dant's right to a fair trial, the proceeding could be closed."
This decision was considered a serious blow to freedom of the
press, but it failed to provide sufficient guidance to courts and at-
torneys because the various justices failed to agree on a standard
for closure. Justice Rehnquist found that "if the parties agree on a
closed proceeding, the trial court is not required by the Sixth
Amendment to advance any reason whatsoever for declining to
open a pretrial hearing or trial to the public."" In contrast, Justice
Powell concluded that the trial judge should hold a hearing and
consider alternatives prior to closing. 5
6. These themes are developed in various degrees in the cases cited supra note 3.
7. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
8. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
9. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
10. The press has no greater right of access than the public. See Saxbe v. Washington
Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974).
11. 443 U.S. at 394.
12. Id. at 391.
13. Id. at 383-84.
14. Id. at 404 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
15. Id. at 401 (Powell, J., concurring).
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The Court clarified much of the confusion generated by the
Gannett decision in Richmond Newspapers. In that case, the de-
fendant made a motion to close his fourth trial on a murder charge
and the trial judge granted the motion. Upon review, seven justices
recognized that the press and the public have a constitutional right
of access to criminal trials based on the first amendment as ap-
plied to the states through the fourteenth amendment."' This right
was found to be necessary to allow an informed discussion of gov-
ernmental affairs and to maintain the integrity of the judicial sys-
tem. According to Justice Brennan, "[o]pen trials assure the public
that procedural rights are respected, and that justice is afforded
equally. Closed trials breed suspicion of prejudice and arbitrari-
ness, which in turn spawns disrespect for law."'17
In Globe Newspaper, the Court expanded upon the standard
to be used prior to trial closure. The Court held that a Massachu-
setts law requiring mandatory closure of sex-offense trials when a
minor victim testified was unconstitutional. The Court concluded
that the state could not summarily deny access under such circum-
stances unless "the denial is necessitated by a compelling govern-
mental interest, and is narrowly tailored to meet that interest."18
Consequently, by the time the Court decided Press-Enter-
prise, the value of open criminal trials had been "recognized in
both logic and experience."1
III. PRESS-ENTERPRISE: THE TEST FOR CLOSURE OF VOIR DIRE
A. The Facts
Press-Enterprise involved a case where a defendant was ac-
cused of an interracial sexual attack and murder. Prior to the
voir dire examination of possible jurors, Press-Enterprise Co. re-
quested that the voir dire be open to the public and press. The
state opposed the newspaper's motion and the trial judge admitted
attendance of the public at only the general voir dire. The general
voir dire consisted of about three days out of a total six weeks of
questioning.21
The defendant was eventually convicted and sentenced to
16. There were seven separate opinions filed with only Justice Rehnquist dissenting.
Justice Powell took no part in consideration of the case.
17. 448 U.S. at 595 (Brennan, J., concurring).
18. 457 U.S. at 607.
19. Id. at 606.
20. 104 S. Ct. at 830.
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death, and Press-Enterprise applied for release of the transcript of
the case. The trial judge, citing juror privacy, denied the request
for the transcript, as did subsequent California courts. The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Califor-
nia court.2
The Press-Enterprise opinion follows the Court's rationale in
Richmond Newspapers regarding the presumption of openness of
criminal trials, but raises a new issue regarding juror privacy.
B. Discussion
The opinion in Press-Enterprise emphasizes at length two fea-
tures of the criminal justice system that explain the right of access
to criminal trials.'3 First, criminal trials have been historically
open in both America and England. 4 The tradition of accessibility
has been so substantial that at the time of the Court's decision in
In re Oliver," the presumption was so solidly grounded that the
Court was "unable to find a single instance of a criminal trial con-
ducted in camera in any federal, state, or municipal court during
the history of this country."' 6 In the Press-Enterprise decision,
Chief Justice Burger determined that public jury selection was the
norm in England in the sixteenth century, and was the common
practice in the United States when the Constitution was adopted. 7
The second feature is that the right to open criminal trials
plays a significant role in the functioning of the judicial process.
The Court had previously determined that public access strength-
ens the judicial process by enhancing the quality and safeguarding
the integrity of the fact-finding process by fostering an appearance
of fairness, thereby heightening public respect, and by permitting
the public to participate in and serve as a check upon the judicial
process.' In addition, openness can have a "community therapeu-
tic value"2 in that public proceedings can "vindicate the concerns
of the victims and the community in knowing that offenders are
being brought to account for their criminal conduct by jurors fairly
and openly selected."'30
22. Id.
23. The opinions in Richmond Newspapers and Globe Newspaper also focus on these
two factors.
24. 104 S. Ct. at 822.
25. 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
26. Id. at 266.
27. 104 S. Ct. at 823.
28. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606.
29. Press-Enterprise, 104 S. Ct. at 822.
30. Id. at 824.
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Once the Court had established the presumption of openness
in criminal trials, including the voir dire,' the Court's analysis
switched to the standard by which closure may be warranted. The
Court determined, in line with Richmond Newspapers and Globe
Newspaper, that
[t]he presumption of openness may be overcome only by an over-
riding interest based on findings that closure is essential to pre-
serve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.
The interest is to be articulated along with findings specific
enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure
order was properly entered.3 2
In Press-Enterprise, the trial court had asserted the right to
privacy of the prospective jurors, in addition to the right of the
defendant to a fair trial, in support of its closure order. s The right
to privacy of the prospective jurors is a new twist on the right to
access in criminal trials. The Court's decision offers some protec-
tion for this privacy interest: "The jury selection process may, in
some circumstances, give rise to a compelling interest of a prospec-
tive juror when interrogation touches on deeply personal matters
that a person has legitimate reasons for keeping out of the public
domain. 3 4
Justices Blackmun3 5 and Marshall 6 wrote concurring opinions
stressing that they did not understand the Court to be deciding
that a juror has a legitimate expectation, rising to the status of a
privacy right, that he will not have to reveal certain matters during
voir dire. Justice Blackmun stated that "it is difficult to believe
that when a prospective juror receives notice that he is called to
serve, he has an expectation, either actual or reasonable, that what
he says in court will be kept private."3 "
Consequently, it is not clear whether prospective jurors have a
legitimate expectation of privacy arising to the level of a constitu-
tional right during voir dire questioning. It is certain, however,
that when the issue arises in a trial context, the Court must take
some steps to protect jurors' privacy."
31. In comparing the defendant's right to a fair trial with the right of the press and
public to attend such trial, Chief Justice Burger indicated that the right of the public to
attend a voir dire is interwoven with the accused's right to a fair trial. Id. at 823.
32. Id. at 824.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 825.
35. Id. at 826 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
36. Id. at 829 (Marshall, J., concurring).
37. Id. at 826 n.1.
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A trial judge is to inform prospective jurors that if certain sen-
sitive questioning will prove damaging to them, they are to make
an affirmative request to present the problem to the judge in cam-
era with counsel and a court reporter present.3 9 If limited closure
is ordered, a transcript of the closed proceedings is to be made
available within a reasonable time if disclosure can be accom-
plished while protecting the jurors' privacy interests.40 Further, the
transcript should only be sealed to the extent that it preserves the
anonymity of the individuals sought to be protected.41 The Su-
preme Court reversed the California trial court's decision to close
voir dire because the state court failed to articulate findings for its
decision, in addition to failing to consider alternatives to closure.4 '
While it is clear that the right of access to criminal trials has
substantial constitutional underpinnings, it is equally clear that
this right is not absolute.43 Closure of any proceedings, however,
"must be rare and only for cause shown that outweighs the value
of the openness.44
IV. THE MONTANA STANDARD
A. The Right of Access and the Right to Know
The Montana Supreme Court has decided two cases within the
past four years relating to the right of access to various phases of
criminal trials. In Great Falls Tribune v. District Court,46 the
court considered the propriety of excluding the press and public
from the individual voir dire examinations of prospective jurors. In
State ex rel. Smith v. District Court," the court established the
standard by which the press and public can be excluded from a
pretrial suppression hearing in order to assure a defendant's right
to a fair trial.
In both cases, the court kept the particular phase of the trial
in question open, basing its decisions in part on federal constitu-
tional law but also to a significant extent on the "right to know"
provision of the Montana Constitution.47
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 826.
42. Id.
43. See Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606; Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581
n.18; Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976).
44. Press-Enterprise, 104 S. Ct. at 824.
45. 186 Mont. 433, 608 P.2d 116 (1980).
46. - Mont. -, 654 P.2d 982 (1982).
47. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 9 provides: "No person shall be deprived of the right to
[Vol. 45
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There is no similar provision in the United States Constitu-
tion. As the court said in Great Falls Tribune, "[i]t is apparent
that the Montana Constitution imposes a stricter standard in order
to authorize closure."48 The court issued a writ of supervisory con-
trol and vacated the closure of the voir dire examination in Great
Falls Tribune accordingly.
The case arose out of the criminal prosecution of State v. Aus-
tad,4 a sensational crime involving the rape and murder of an eld-
erly woman and a subsequent high speed chase in which the defen-
dant crashed into nine parked automobiles and was severely
injured. There were ninety-two exhibits relating to press coverage
of the incident, but that still did not justify closure. The court
reasoned:
Open public proceedings have long been recognized as a corner-
stone in preserving the quality and integrity of the judicial pro-
cess. Closure of judicial proceedings brings suspicion and mistrust
in the minds of the public and representatives of the media. Such
closure is simply censorship at the source-the denial of the right
to know. 0
The court concluded its opinion by holding that "[niothing short
of strict and irreparable necessity to insure defendant's right to a
fair trial should suffice""1 to close any part of a trial.
B. The Test for Closure: A Clear and Present Danger
The decision in State ex rel. Smith further defined what the
fair trial closure standard is in Montana. Rather than develop the
Great Falls Tribune test of "strict and irreparable necessity, the
court adopted Standard 8-3.2 of the American Bar Association
Standards for Criminal Justice.2
examine documents or to observe the deliberations of all public bodies or agencies of state
government and its subdivisions, except in cases in which the demand of individual privacy
clearly exceeds the merits of public disclosures."
48. 186 Mont. at 440, 608 P.2d at 120.
49. - Mont. - , 641 P.2d 1373 (1982).
50. Great Falls Tribune, 186 Mont. at 438, 608 P.2d at 119.
51. Id. at 441, 608 P.2d at 121.
52. State ex rel. Smith,__ Mont. at -, 654 P.2d at 987. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JusTrIC § 8-3.2 (2d ed. 1978 & Supp. 1982) provides:
Except as provided below, pretrial proceedings and their record shall be open
to the public, including representatives of the news media. If at the pretrial pro-
ceeding testimony or evidence is adduced that is likely to threaten the fairness of
a trial, the presiding officer shall advise those present of the danger and shall seek
the voluntary cooperation of the news media in delaying dissemination of poten-
tially prejudicial information by means of public communication until the impan-
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According to State ex rel. Smith, the first step trial judges are
to take when confronted with a motion to close trial proceedings is
to seek the voluntary cooperation of news media, who are en-
couraged to "exercise prudent judgment" about the dissemination
of any information that "would create a clear and present danger
to the fairness of defendant's trial."5 If a suitable arrangement
cannot be reached between press, counsel, and the court, "the trial
court must then proceed to hearing."5'
The trial judge must make certain findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law to support a closure order.5 5 The supreme court sug-
gested that the findings include evidence regarding the number of
listeners and readers in the general population, statistics regarding
the percentage of media listeners/readers who follow criminal news
reports, and expert psychological testimony concerning the ability
of people to disregard pretrial publicity. The evidence gathered at
the hearing is then to be scrutinized to see if it presents a "clear
and present danger" to trial fairness. That such danger exists is
exceedingly difficult to show.
The standard was developed to a significant extent in a
landmark prior restraint case, Nebraska Press Association v. Stew-
art.56 In that case, the United States Supreme Court held a judge
could not prevent the press from reporting information gathered
from public records or court proceedings that stemmed from the
brutal murder of six persons in a small Nebraska town. There was
evidence of necrophilia and the crime had attracted immediate
widespread publicity, including incriminating statements by the
accused. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, found that
justice. The presiding officer may close a preliminary hearing, bail hearing, or any
other pretrial proceeding, including a motion to suppress, and may seal the record
only if:
(a) the dissemination of information from the pretrial proceeding
and its record would create a clear and present danger to the fairness of
the trial, and
(b) the prejudicial effect of such information on trial fairness can-
not be avoided by any reasonable alternative means.
The defendant may move that all or part of the proceeding be closed to the
public (including representatives of the news media), or, with the consent of the
defendant, the presiding officer may take such action sua sponte or at the sugges-
tion of the prosecution. Whenever under this rule all or part of any pretrial pro-
ceeding is held in chambers or otherwise closed to the public, a complete record
shall be kept and made available to the public following the completion of trial or
earlier if consistent with trial fairness.
53. __ Mont. at - , 654 P.2d at 987.
54. Id. at -, 654 P.2d at 988.
55. Id.
56. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
330 [Vol. 45
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Nebraska had failed to meet the "heavy burden imposed as a con-
dition to securing the prior restraint."57 In his concurring opinion,
Justice Brennan stated:
[J]udges have at their disposal a broad spectrum of devices for
ensuring that fundamental fairness is accorded the accused with-
out necessitating so drastic an incursion on the equally funda-
mental and salutary constitutional mandate that discussion of
public affairs in free society cannot depend on the preliminary
grace of judicial censors."
That comment capsulizes the United States Supreme Court's
reluctance to close public proceedings without first attempting
other methods to protect the rights of the parties. It reflects, along
with Standard 8-3.2, the fact that we live in an informed society
that has frequent access to comprehensive coverage of newsworthy
events. Furthermore, analysis of empirical studies on pretrial pub-
licity indicates that for the most part juries base their decisions on
the evidence rather than on extraneous information from outside
the record. 9
The Chief Justice in Nebraska Press Association noted that
the trial judge was correct in concluding that there was intense
pretrial publicity surrounding the case, but found that the further
"conclusion as to the impact of such publicity on prospective ju-
rors was of necessity speculative, dealing as he was in factors un-
known and unknowable." 60 If the situation in Nebraska Press As-
sociation did not present a clear and present danger to defendant's
fair trial rights, one is hard-pressed to imagine a case that would.
That statement, however, must be understood in the context of the
many alternatives available to insure trial fairness.
Under the Montana decision in State ex rel. Smith, if the evi-
dence gathered at the hearing indicates that there might be a clear
and present danger to trial fairness, the trial court must "then
hear evidence and argument as to whether less restrictive alterna-
tives would suffice to ensure a fair trial."'61
The commentary to Standard 8-3.2 indicates several alterna-
tives should be considered, including: (1) continuance, (2) sever-
ance, (3) change of venue, (4) change of venire, (5) intensive voir
dire, (6) additional preemptory challenges, (7) sequestration of the
57. Id. at 570.
58. Id. at 572 (Brennan, J., concurring).
59. Simon, Does the Court's Decision in Nebraska Press Association Fit the Research
Evidence on the Impact on Jurors of News Coverage?, 29 STAN. L. REv. 431, 450 (1977).
60. 427 U.S. at 563.
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jury, and (8) admonitory instructions to the jury.62 If any of these
alternatives would adequately protect a defendant's right to a fair
trial, then they should be used and the trial proceedings are to
remain open. "Only if the trial court finds there is a 'clear and
present danger' and that less restrictive alternatives, including a
protective order, cannot protect a defendant's right to a fair trial,
should closure be ordered." 63
V. CONCLUSION
There is a strong presumption under the United States Con-
stitution and the right to know provision of the Montana Constitu-
tion in favor of open judicial proceedings in criminal trials.
In Montana, to overcome this presumption in closed criminal
proceedings, the trial judges must satisfy the exacting criteria of
the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice. First, the news media
must be given notice that a closure motion is before the court. The
media can comply with the court's request to limit information dis-
semination or it can object that such a limitation is unnecessary.
Second, if there is an objection, the court must make certain
findings of fact which indicate there is a "clear and present dan-
ger" to trial fairness. That is difficult to demonstrate, but if the
evidence as a whole indicates such a finding, the trial court then
must hear evidence and argument concerning less restrictive alter-
natives to closure. If the court affirmatively concludes that no al-
ternative would sufficiently protect defendant's right to a fair trial,
and that trial closure would effectively protect that right, then the
trial proceedings can be closed to the extent necessary to protect
trial fairness.
The United States Supreme Court has developed nearly the
same standards for criminal trials, including voir dire, in Press-
Enterprise, Richmond Newspapers, Globe Newspaper, and Ne-
braska Press Association. Whether it will apply these standards to
pretrial suppression hearings, as did the Montana Supreme Court,
remains to be seen.6 Several federal appellate courts have held
that the first amendment extends some degree of public access to
pretrial suppression hearings. 5
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. The Supreme Court has yet to authoritatively frame a standard for closure of pre-
trial suppression hearings that incorporates the rigorous first amendment standards in the
cases discussed supra.
65. See, e.g., Herald Co. v. Klepfer, No. 83-7984 (2d Cir. 1984); U.S. v. Brooklier, 685
F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1982); U.S. v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550 (3rd Cir. 1982).
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It is clear that trial judges have their work cut out for them
before they close any part of a criminal proceeding. After the
Press-Enterprise decision, it appears that trial judges must now be
concerned with the right of privacy as it relates to prospective ju-
rors' keeping certain sensitive information confidential. Fortu-
nately, the standard to be applied in protecting jury privacy paral-
lels the defendant's right to a fair trial. The trial judge will need to
make explicit findings of fact and conclusions of law as to why clo-
sure is necessary to protect jurors' privacy rights or defendants'
fair trial rights. In either case, the burden of sustaining a closure
order is difficult, since "the primacy of the accused's right is diffi-
cult to separate from the right of everyone in the community to
attend .... -66
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